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It has been argued that servicizing business models, under which a firm sells the use of a product rather
than the product itself, are environmentally beneficial. The main arguments are: First, under servicizing
the firm charges customers based on the product usage. Second, the quantity of products required to meet
customer needs may be smaller because the firm may be able to pool customer needs. Third, the firm may
have an incentive to offer products with higher efficiency. Motivated by these arguments, we investigate
the economic and environmental potential of servicizing business models. We endogenize the firm’s choice
between a pure sales, a pure servicizing, and a hybrid model with both sales and servicizing options, the
pricing decisions and, the resulting customer usage. We consider two extremes of pooling efficacy, viz., no
versus strong pooling. We find that under no pooling servicizing leads to higher environmental impact due
to production but lower environmental impact due to use. In contrast, under strong pooling, when a hybrid
business model is more profitable, it is also environmentally superior. However, a pure servicizing model is
environmentally inferior for high production costs as it leads to a larger production quantity even under
strong pooling. We also examine the product efficiency choice and find that the firm offers higher efficiency
products only under servicizing models with strong pooling.
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1. Introduction
An emerging paradigm among manufacturers in various industries involves the implementation of
innovative business models that sell the functionality or use of a product instead of the product
itself. For example, rather than only selling printers, Xerox also offers “document management”
services under which it charges customers for each page they print (Fischer et al. 2012, Xerox
2013a). Similarly, through its SmartCloud program, IBM offers computing and storage services and
charges customers for the use of the servers (IBM 2013a). The transition to such business models,
under which firms sell the use of the products, has been termed as servicizing (cf., Toffel 2008).
Servicizing business models have received growing attention from several environmental groups and
agencies because of their potential environmental benefits (White et al. 1999, Rothenberg 2007,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009, Fischer et al. 2012).
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The main arguments in support of the environmental superiority of servicizing are: First, under
servicizing, the firm typically employs pay-per-use pricing, which directly links the price charged to
the customers’ product usage (e.g., the number of pages printed, GB used, or the time the product
is used). Therefore, from the customers’ perspective, such business models transform the fixed cost
associated with the ownership of the product to a variable cost associated with the use of the
product. This may incentivize customers to curtail their usage, lowering the environmental impact
due to product use. Second, under some servicizing models, instead of providing each customer
with a dedicated product, the firm may maintain a pool of products from which customers’ needs
are met. Such pooling may enable the firm to meet customer needs with fewer units, reducing the
environmental impact due to production. Third, as the firm is paid based on customers’ usage,
it may have a greater incentive to offer products with higher efficiency in order to reduce the
operating costs associated with the use of the products. Higher efficiency products may lower the
environmental impact during use as they require less energy and resources.
Despite the popularity of these arguments, the environmental superiority of servicizing is not
clear (cf., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009, p. 19). The reason is that the above argu-
ments do not account for the full scope of how the firm’s and a customer’s decisions depend on the
structural characteristics of servicizing business models. For example, under servicizing, the pricing
is based only on the product usage, and for that reason, the firm may be able to reach customers
who do not buy the product under a conventional sales model. This may lead to a larger number of
customers adopting and using a product, making servicizing environmentally inferior. In addition,
while pooling may reduce the production volume, it may also enable the firm to charge a lower price
and further increase the product adoption and usage. Moreover, if the firm offers a more efficient
product, then customers may increase their product usage due to the lower operating costs. This
phenomenon is commonly known as the rebound effect (see Greening et al. 2000 for an overview).
Such an increase in the customer usage would lead to higher total environmental impact due to use.
Even if servicizing itself is environmentally beneficial, instead of only offering a servicizing option,
the firm may prefer to offer a “hybrid” business model that includes both a sales and a servicizing
option. This may attenuate the potential environmental benefits of servicizing. Therefore, it is not
clear whether and when servicizing business models are environmentally superior.
In this paper, we analytically investigate when and why servicizing is both more profitable
and environmentally superior to a conventional sales model. We develop an analytical model that
captures the differences in the structural characteristics of servicizing business models commonly
found in practice. In particular, we allow the firm to choose between offering a conventional sales
model and two different types of servicizing models: i) a hybrid model with both a sales and a
servicizing option or ii) a pure servicizing model with only a servicizing option. Under a servicizing
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option, the firm employs pay-per-use pricing and may be able to meet customer needs with fewer
products. We explicitly account for the firm’s ability to meet customers’ needs with fewer products
by varying the efficacy of pooling from strong to none, with the latter implying that the firm
provides each customer with a dedicated product. We also account for heterogeneity in customers’
usage needs and endogenize their usage decisions. This allows us to identify how customers’ usage
changes across the business models due to the differences in pricing and the extent to which the
firm can meet customer needs with fewer products. Moreover, we also endogenize the firm’s choice
of product efficiency and examine whether the firm prefers to offer a product with higher efficiency
under a servicizing model.
Our results offer several key insights for firms and environmental groups regarding when and
why servicizing business models are both more profitable and environmentally beneficial. First,
when there is no pooling, the firm prefers to offer servicizing only through a hybrid model. In this
case, we find that the hybrid business model is environmentally superior only for products such as
printers and aircraft engines that have the majority of their environmental impact in the use phase.
Therefore, our results suggest that business models like Xerox’s document management services or
Volvo Aero’s power-by-the-hour program for engines are environmentally superior.
Second, we find that under strong pooling, the firm prefers to offer a hybrid business model
when the production cost is low and a pure servicizing business model when the production cost is
high. One would expect servicizing models with stronger pooling to result in a smaller production
quantity, and thus lower environmental impact due to production. Accordingly, we do find that
when the firm prefers to offer a hybrid business model under strong pooling, it is also environ-
mentally superior. However, under strong pooling, a pure servicizing business model is actually
environmentally inferior for high production costs because it leads to a larger quantity of products
than pure sales. Therefore, our results suggest that cloud and storage services, which are charac-
terized by strong pooling, are environmentally superior for low-cost servers as the firm prefers to
offer a hybrid model. On the other hand, they are environmentally inferior for high-cost servers as
the firm prefers to offer a pure servicizing model, as in the case of IBM’s SmartCloud program.
Hence, our results offer important insights for managers and policy makers regarding how the
economic and environmental performance of servicizing depends on the structure of the business
model, specifically, whether it is offered through a hybrid or a pure servicizing model.
Third, despite the fact that the firm’s revenue is linked to the customers’ usage, we show that
the firm actually offers lower efficiency products under a servicizing business model when there
is no pooling. However, when pooling is strong, the firm does offer more efficient products. This
highlights the importance of accounting for operational characteristics such as the pooling efficacy,
to assess the environmental performance of servicizing. We also identify a novel mechanism for
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the environmental superiority of servicizing by showing that it moderates (or even eliminates) the
rebound effect.
2. Literature Review
Our work contributes to two different streams of literature in sustainable operations, viz., research
on environmentally sustainable business models (cf., Girotra and Netessine 2013 for an overview)
and research on green product design (cf., Agrawal and Toktay 2009 for an overview).
An emerging stream of literature in operations management analyzes the environmental per-
formance of business models that decouple customer value from product ownership. For example,
Agrawal et al. (2012) investigate when product leasing is environmentally superior to sales. In
this paper, we focus on servicizing, which differs from leasing in two important aspects: i) the
payment is directly linked to product usage and ii) the firm may not have to dedicate one product
to each customer. Closer in spirit to our work are papers that analyze the intricacies of specific
servicizing business models. Motivated by chemical management services used in the automotive
industry, Corbett and DeCroix (2001) and Corbett et al. (2005) examine shared-savings contracts
for materials such as chemical solvents, and analyze whether such contracts lead to a decrease
in consumption of indirect materials. Bellos et al. (2013) study the economic and environmental
implications of an auto manufacturer’s decision to offer car sharing. Avci et al. (2015) analyze the
implementation of business models posed to eliminate range anxiety for electric vehicles by pro-
viding battery-switching stations and by charging customers only for the use of the batteries. In a
similar context, Lim et al. (2015) study whether leasing batteries and/or offering different charging
options can increase adoption of electric vehicles, in the presence of range and resale anxiety.
These papers consider the firm’s choice of business model. However, they do not account for
product design decisions. Moreover, most of them do not consider the case where the firm may
offer a hybrid business model, which provides customers with both a sales and a servicizing option.
In this paper, we explicitly investigate how the firm’s product efficiency choice influences the
environmental performance of servicizing and we also consider the firm’s optimal choice between
a pure sales, a pure servicizing, and a hybrid business model.
Another stream of literature in sustainable operations examines the environmental implications
of a firm’s product design and development decisions. Several papers focus on design decisions such
as product modularity (Agrawal and U¨lku¨ 2013) or replacement of hazardous substances (Kraft
et al. 2013). Other studies also examine the effect of environmental legislation on product design,
such as efficiency and remanufacturability (Subramanian et al. 2009), and development time and
expenditure (Plambeck and Wang 2009). However, these papers focus only on conventional sales
business models. Recent papers have also studied product design decisions under performance-based
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contracting, a type of servicizing business model under which payment to the firm is linked to the
uptime of the product. In such a setting, Kim et al. (2011) and Guajardo et al. (2012) investigate
a manufacturer’s choice of product reliability. In a similar vein, Chan et al. (2014) study the
effect of pay-per-service versus fixed-fee maintenance plans on the reliability of medical equipment.
However, these papers do not analyze the environmental implications or explicitly account for the
customer usage decisions. We contribute to this stream of literature by investigating how the firm’s
product efficiency choice differs across different business models when customers’ usage decisions
are endogenized. This allows us to capture how a product design choice such as efficiency, depends
on the choice and structure of the business model, and on operational characteristics such as the
efficacy of pooling.
Overall, in the context of servicizing, this is the first paper, to the best of our knowledge, to
analyze the joint effect of product design and business model choices on the firm’s economic and
environmental performance.
3. The Model
We formulate a sequential, firm-customer game, where a profit-maximizing monopolist makes its
decisions, followed by the customers. The sequence of events is the following: The firm determines
the product efficiency and then chooses between offering a pure sales or a servicizing business
model. Subsequently, it sets the sales and/or pay-per-use price, and the customers make their usage
decisions.
The firm chooses the product efficiency denoted by e∈ [0,1]. A higher value of e implies a more
efficient product. Specifically, e= 0 represents the baseline efficiency whereas e= 1 represents the
maximum feasible product efficiency. The firm’s choice of product efficiency influences the produc-
tion and operating costs. We denote the cost of manufacturing a product by c(e). As manufacturing
a more efficient product may require higher quality materials, we assume that c(e) is increasing in
product efficiency. The operating cost per unit of usage is denoted by k(e). We assume that k(e)
decreases in the product efficiency because a more efficient product requires less energy and fewer
resources during its use (i.e., it offers the same level of use at a lower cost).
The firm next decides which business model to offer. Specifically, it chooses among the following
business models: i) a pure sales model, under which it offers only a sales option, ii) a pure servicizing
business model, under which it offers only a servicizing option, and iii) a hybrid business model,
under which it offers both a sales and a servicizing option. For brevity, we refer to the pure
servicizing and hybrid business models collectively as servicizing business models. We use the
superscript i∈ {p,h} to indicate a pure (i.e., i= p) or a hybrid (i.e., i= h) business model and the
subscript j ∈ {sa, se} to denote the sales (i.e., j = sa) or the servicizing (i.e., j = se) option. Given
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the business model, the firm makes its pricing decisions. Under the sales option, the firm sells the
product to the customers by charging a fixed sales price, f isa, whereas under the servicizing option,
the firm sells the usage of the product by charging a per unit of usage (e.g., per-page printed, GB
used, or time the product is used) price, f ise.
1
Observing the product efficiency and the prices under a given business model, the customers
then decide through which option to satisfy their needs, and also determine their product usage qij.
Customers are heterogeneous in terms of their usage need θ. We assume θ is uniformly distributed
between zero and one. Without loss of generality, we normalize the size of the customer population
to one. The gross utility a customer of type θ derives from a product usage qij is given by Vθ
(
qij
) .
=
1
b
(
θqij −
(qij)
2
2
)
, which is concave increasing in qij. Therefore, a customer derives greater utility
from higher usage but with decreasing returns and never chooses a qij > θ. The parameter b can be
interpreted as the change in usage per unit change in the operating cost and/or pay-per-use price
(cf. Lambrecht et al. 2007), which can also be observed in Lemma 1 below.
We assume that customers are always responsible for the operating cost k(e) incurred per unit of
usage. Our results remain unchanged if we relax this assumption to account for the case where under
the servicizing option the firm bears the operating cost. The reason is that the firm simply transfers
the cost to the customers. In §5.5, we also discuss how our results are influenced in the case where
the operating cost is lower if incurred by the firm. The firm charges a usage-independent price, f isa,
under the sales option, and a pay-per-use price, f ise, under the servicizing option. Therefore, the net
utility of customer θ is given by U isa (q
i
sa;θ, f
i
sa, e)
.
= Vθ (q
i
sa)− k (e) qisa− f isa and U ise (qise;θ, f ise, e) .=
Vθ(q
i
se)−
(
k (e) + f ise
)
qise under the sales and servicizing option, respectively.
2
3.1 Customers’ problem
For any option j ∈ {sa, se} under a given business model i∈ {p,h}, the customers maximize their
net utility by choosing their usage, qij. The utility-maximization problem of a customer θ is given
by maxqij≥0U
i
j
(
qij;θ, f
i
j , e
)
, where U ij
(
qij;θ, f
i
j , e
)
is strictly concave in qij and increasing in θ. Let
qi
∗
j
(
θ;f ij , e
)
denote the optimal usage obtained by solving customer θ’s problem. The next lemma
compares the optimal usage of a customer under the sales and the servicizing option.
Lemma 1. The individual usage of an adopting customer θ is lower under the servicizing option
than under the sales option. Specifically, qi
∗
se (θ;f
i
se, e)
.
= θ−b(f ise+k (e) )< ql∗sa (θ;f lsa, e) .= θ−bk (e),
where i, l ∈ {p,h}.
1 We assume that under servicizing the firm does not incur any transaction cost for monitoring the customers’ usage.
Such a cost lowers the profitability of servicizing, but may improve its relative environmental performance as the firm
charges a higher pay-per-use price to recoup it.
2 The customer utility is quadratic in qij , leading to an optimal usage that is linear in the pay-per-use price. In §5.4,
we also consider utility functions that result in nonlinear optimal usage.
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The individual usage of a customer is lower under the servicizing option due to the pay-per-use
pricing. Under the sales option, the usage-independent price acts as a sunk cost, and an additional
unit of usage does not increase the price paid by the customer. However, under the servicizing
option, the customer pays the firm for each additional unit of usage, and thus, all else being equal,
chooses a lower usage. This illustrates a key driver behind one of the main arguments for the
environmental superiority of servicizing, viz., that pay-per-use pricing incentivizes customers to
curtail their consumption. However, the above result does not characterize how pay-per-use pricing
influences the number of customers that choose an option, which as we discuss later, may lead to
higher aggregate usage.
Under a given business model, the customers decide which option maximizes their net utility.
Under a pure sales model, a customer can choose to purchase the product or remain inactive.
Similarly, under a pure servicizing model, a customer can choose to participate in servicizing or
remain inactive. Let the marginal customer who is indifferent between participating in a pure
business model and being inactive be denoted by Θpj =
{
θ :Upj
(
qp
∗
j ;θ, f
p
j , e
)
= 0
}
for j ∈ {sa, se}.
Under a hybrid business model, a customer can choose to purchase the product through
the sales option, participate in the servicizing option, or remain inactive. Let the marginal
customer indifferent between the sales and the servicizing option be denoted by Θh1 ={
θ :Uhsa
(
qh
∗
sa ;θ, f
h
sa, e
)
=Uhse
(
qh
∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e
)}
and the marginal customer indifferent between partici-
pating in the servicizing option and being inactive be denoted by Θh2 =
{
θ :Uhse
(
qh
∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e
)
= 0
}
.
It is straightforward to show that customers in θ ∈ [Θh1 ,1] choose sales, customers in θ ∈ [Θh2 ,Θh1)
choose servicizing and, the rest remain inactive. That is, the customers who have higher usage
needs purchase the product, and those with lower usage needs participate in servicizing. The rea-
son is that under the sales option, the price f isa, that customers pay is independent of their usage.
However, under the servicizing option a customer θ effectively pays f iseq
i∗
se (θ), which is higher for
customers with higher usage needs θ.
3.2 Firm’s problem
We now formulate the firm’s problem. Let npj
(
fpj , e
)
denote the number of customers who adopt
a pure business model (i.e., the customers who choose to purchase the product or its use). Let
Qpj
(
fpj , e
)
denote the quantity of products required to meet the customer needs. For the hybrid
model, let the number of people who choose an option j ∈ {sa, se} be denoted by nhj (fhsa, fhse, e) and
the quantity of products required to meet their needs be denoted by Qhj (f
h
sa, f
h
se, e). Under a servi-
cizing business model, the firm may be able to pool the needs of customers who participate in the
servicizing option. Therefore, the quantity of products required to meet the needs of these customers
may be lower than the adoption, i.e., Qpse(f
p
se, e)≤ npse(fpse, e) and Qhse(fhsa, fhse, e)≤ nhse(fhsa, fhse, e).
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Under the sales option, as the firm provides each customer with a dedicated product, the quantity of
products is equal to the adoption, i.e., Qpsa(f
p
sa, e) = n
p
sa(f
p
sa, e) and Q
h
sa(f
h
sa, f
h
se, e) = n
h
sa(f
h
sa, f
h
se, e).
In addition, we define the aggregate usage under a given option as the amount of product usage
aggregated over all adopting customers. Under a pure business model, the aggregate usage is
given by Ωpj (f
p
j , e) =
∫ 1
Θ
p
j
qp
∗
j (θ;f
p
j , e)dθ. Similarly, under the hybrid business model, the aggregate
usage for the sales and the servicizing option is given by Ωhsa(f
h
sa, f
h
se, e) =
∫ 1
Θh1
qh
∗
sa (θ;f
h
sa, e)dθ and
Ωhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se, e) =
∫ Θh1
Θh2
qh
∗
se (θ;f
h
se, e)dθ, respectively.
Under a pure sales model, the firm charges a usage-independent price, fpsa, for every product
sold. The firm’s pricing problem is then given by
max
f
p
sa
Πpsa(f
p
sa;e)
.
=
(
fpsa− c(e)
)
npsa(f
p
sa;e).
Before we formulate the firm’s problem for a servicizing business model, we explain how we
model the firm’s ability to pool customers’ needs by maintaining a pool of products for those
who choose servicizing. The required quantity of products depends on the efficacy of pooling,
which may be influenced by exogenous product or industry related factors. For example, compared
to IBM’s SmartCloud program, in which the firm can route customer requests at any available
server, a model such as Xerox’s document management services may be characterized by a weaker
pooling effect because certain customers may still require a minimum number of on-site printers.
We capture the strength of the pooling effect with the parameter γ. A larger value of γ indicates
stronger pooling, implying that, all else being equal, the firm can satisfy the customers’ needs by
producing a smaller quantity of products (i.e., Qise(·) is decreasing in γ). For servicizing business
models, (i.e., when j = se) hereafter we also include the subscript γ to indicate different degrees of
pooling (e.g., Qiseγ(·)).
In general, the quantity of products Qise required to meet the needs of the customers who
choose servicizing depends on the aggregate usage Ωise(·), the strength of the pooling effect γ,
and the maximum usage q¯ that a product can offer. We normalize q¯ to one. Therefore, if pooling
is perfect (i.e., if customers’ requests do not overlap), then the quantity of products required to
meet customer demand under servicizing is given by Qise(·) = Ωise(·)/q¯= Ωise(·)/1, which under the
customers’ optimal usage decisions (see Lemma 1), reduces to Qise(·) =
(
nise(·)
)2
/2. This represents
the best case scenario where the firm can achieve maximum pooling. The efficacy of pooling may
diminish to the point where the firm provides each customer with a dedicated product, in which
case Qise(·) = nise(·).
To capture the intermediate range between these two extremes of pooling efficacy, one can
model the quantity of products required to meet customer needs under servicizing as Qiseγ(·) .=
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niseγ(·)
)γ
/γ, where the parameter γ ∈ [1,2] represents the strength of the pooling effect. This
specification accounts for several important aspects of pooling: First, as the number of adopting
customers increases, the firm requires a larger quantity of products (i.e., Qseγ(·) is increasing in
nseγ). Second, the quantity of products required is decreasing in the strength of the pooling effect
(i.e., Qseγ(·) is decreasing in γ). Third, it captures the two extremes of pooling as at γ = 1, we have
the no pooling case (i.e., Qise1(·) = nise1(·)), and at γ = 2, we have the maximum pooling case (i.e.,
Qise2(·) =
(
nise2(·)
)2
/2). The above specification implicitly assumes that the quantity of required
products is convex in the adoption (i.e., the efficacy of pooling decreases in the adoption). In §5.2,
we show that an alternative queueing-based model of pooling also provides a specification that is
convex in the adoption. In §5.3, we examine the robustness of our results to this assumption by
extending our analysis to consider an alternative model of pooling with economies of scale, where
the quantity of products required is concave in the adoption.
For analytical tractability, in our main analysis we focus on the two extreme cases described by
γ ∈ {1,2}, and we refer to the γ = 1 case as no pooling and the γ = 2 case as strong pooling. We
discuss our results for a general γ ∈ (1,2) in §5.1.
Under a pure servicizing model, the firm charges a pay-per-use price fpseγ , which along with
the aggregate usage determines its overall revenue. The firm’s pricing problem under this business
model is given by
max
f
p
seγ
Πpseγ(f
p
seγ ;e)
.
= fpseγΩ
p
seγ(f
p
seγ ;e)− c(e)Qpseγ(fpseγ ;e).
Under a hybrid business model, the firm charges a usage-independent price fhsaγ for the sales
option and a pay-per-use price fhseγ for the servicizing option. Therefore, in this case, the firm’s
pricing problem can be written as
max
fhsaγ ,f
h
seγ
Πhγ(f
h
saγ , f
h
seγ ;e) = Π
h
saγ(f
h
saγ , f
h
seγ ;e) + Π
h
seγ(f
h
saγ , f
h
seγ ;e)
=
(
fhsaγ − c(e)
)
Qhsaγ(f
h
saγ , f
h
seγ ;e) + f
h
seγΩ
h
seγ(f
h
saγ , f
h
seγ , e)− c(e)Qhseγ(fhsaγ , fhseγ ;e).
Let f i
∗
jγ(e) denote the profit-maximizing price under a given business model and efficiency, and
define Π˜pjγ(e)
.
= Π(fp
∗
jγ ;e) and Π˜
h
γ(e)
.
= Πhγ(f
h∗
saγ , f
h∗
seγ ;e). The firm’s problem of choosing the optimal
business model is Π˜∗γ(e)
.
= max
{
Π˜psa(e), Π˜
p
seγ(e), Π˜
h
γ(e)
}
. Finally, the firm’s problem of choosing
efficiency is given by max0≤e≤1 Π˜∗γ(e).
3.3 Environmental impact
In order to measure the total environmental impact of a business model, we adopt a product
life cycle perspective, and consider two different phases of the product life cycle, viz., production
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and use. Let ηm denote the environmental impact due to the production of a unit. The total
environmental impact due to production depends on ηm and the quantity of products. Let ηu
denote the environmental impact per unit of usage.3 The total environmental impact due to use
depends on ηu and the aggregate usage. The total environmental impact is given by E
p
j
(
fpj , e
)
=
ηmQ
p
j
(
fpj , e
)
+ ηuΩ
p
j
(
fpj , e
)
for a pure business model, where j ∈ {sa, se}, and by Eh (fhsa, fhse, e) =
ηm
(
Qhsa (f
h
sa, f
h
se, e) +Q
h
se (f
h
sa, f
h
se, e)
)
+ ηu
(
Ωhsa (f
h
sa, f
h
se, e) + Ω
h
se (f
h
sa, f
h
se, e)
)
for a hybrid model.
4. Analysis and Results
We consider subgame perfect equilibria and solve our analytical model using backward induction.
In order to rule out uninteresting cases where the benchmark pure sales model is not profitable,
we assume throughout our analysis that the production cost is not prohibitively high (i.e., c(e)<(
1−k(e)
)2
2
holds for all e∈ [0,1]; see Appendix §A1).
4.1 Pricing Decisions and Optimal Business Model Choice.
In this section, we solve for the firm’s pricing decisions and the optimal choice of business model
for a given product efficiency. This allows us to identify when a servicizing business model is more
profitable, and compare its environmental performance to our benchmark of pure sales. We begin
by focusing on the case of no pooling (i.e., γ = 1).
Proposition 1. Under no pooling: If c (e)<C1
(
k (e)
)
, then the firm offers the hybrid business
model, which leads to higher adoption and quantity of products, but lower aggregate usage, than
under pure sales. Otherwise, the firm offers pure sales.
Under a hybrid business model, the firm offers both sales and servicizing options, which allows for
better price discrimination by more effectively segmenting the customers. In particular, customers
with higher usage needs choose the sales option and customers with lower usage needs choose the
servicizing option. This makes the hybrid business model more attractive than a pure business
model, which provides only one option. However, the firm offers a hybrid business model only if
the production cost is sufficiently low. This is because the adoption is higher under the hybrid
business model due to pay-per-use pricing, leading to a higher total production cost. When the
unit production cost is sufficiently high, the increase in the total production cost outweighs the
benefit from better price discrimination, making the hybrid business model less profitable.
Note that a hybrid business model leads to higher product adoption, which results in a larger
quantity of products. A higher adoption also implies that there are customers with low usage needs
3 Our analysis can easily include the environmental impact during disposal by considering ηm to also include the
environmental impact due to the eventual disposal of the product. Additionally, both ηm and ηu may depend on the
product efficiency. We discuss this case in §4.2.
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who are inactive under a pure sales model, but become active under a hybrid model, and therefore,
increase their individual usage. However, the aggregate usage is still lower under a hybrid business
model. The reason is that as the firm offers both sales and servicizing options, some customers with
high usage needs who purchase a product under a pure sales model now switch to the servicizing
option. In this case, the individual usage of the switching customers decreases (see Lemma 1).
Overall, this decrease dominates the increase in the individual usage of customers who become
active under a hybrid business model, leading to lower aggregate usage.
Based on the above result, we now summarize the environmental performance of servicizing
business models when they are more profitable under no pooling.
Corollary 1. Under no pooling: A servicizing business model is environmentally superior only
for products that have the majority of their impact in the use phase, i.e., ω
.
= ηm
ηm+ηu
≤ ω1.
Corollary 1 shows that even with no pooling, a servicizing business model can be environmentally
superior for products such as printers and aircraft engines, which have most of their environmental
impact in the use phase (cf., Xerox 2010, Lopes 2010). This implies that, despite the limited pooling
ability, business models such as Xerox’s document management services or Volvo Aero’s power-
by-the-hour program (Fischer et al. 2012) can be environmentally superior. However, a servicizing
business model is environmentally inferior to sales for products such as heavy machinery or tires
that have the majority of their impact in the production phase. Hence, in contrast to the proposed
arguments in practice that pay-per-use pricing may result in servicizing business models being
environmentally superior, we find that it may actually render them environmentally inferior.
The above result is similar in spirit to some findings of previous research on certain business
models where customers do not own the product and the firm dedicates a product to each customer.
However, the underlying mechanism differs in our context. In particular, Agrawal et al. (2012) show
that leasing may lead to higher environmental impact due to production but lower environmental
impact due to use. This is because a leasing firm reduces the cannibalization of new products
by removing off-lease products from the market. In our context, this result is instead driven by
pay-per-use pricing. In a similar vein, Avci et al. (2015) show that using battery-switching stations
and allowing customers to pay only for the use of the batteries may increase the adoption of
electric vehicles. However, in their context, this result arises because the switching stations lower
the range-inconvenience penalty incurred by the drivers of electric vehicles.
We next focus on the case of strong pooling (i.e., γ = 2). We begin by characterizing the firm’s
optimal choice of business model.
Proposition 2. Under strong pooling: If c
(
e
)
<C2
(
k(e)
)
, then the firm offers the hybrid busi-
ness model, where C2
(
k(e)
)
>C1
(
k(e)
)
. Otherwise, it offers the pure servicizing business model.
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Similar to Proposition 1, the firm prefers to offer the hybrid business model only when the
production cost is below a threshold. While under the hybrid business model the firm cannot pool
the needs of customers who choose sales instead of the servicizing option, under pure servicizing it
pools the needs of all participating customers. As the benefit of pooling is more salient for products
with a higher production cost, a pure servicizing business model is more profitable than a hybrid
business model when the production cost is high.
We next compare the environmental performance of a hybrid business model under strong pooling
to our benchmark of pure sales.
Proposition 3. Under strong pooling: If the firm offers the hybrid model (i.e., if c
(
e
)
<
C2
(
k(e)
)
), then the adoption is higher but the quantity of products and the aggregate usage is lower
than under pure sales.
Recall from Proposition 1 that when there is no pooling, a hybrid business model allows for
better price discrimination, which results in higher adoption. This is also true when pooling is
strong. However, in this case the increase in adoption does not translate into larger quantity of
products because the firm can more effectively pool the customers’ needs. Similar to when there is
no pooling, the aggregate usage is lower under the hybrid business model due to the lower individual
usage of customers who switch from purchasing a product to using it under the servicizing option.
We next compare the environmental performance of a pure servicizing business model under
strong pooling to our benchmark of pure sales.
Proposition 4. Under strong pooling: If the firm offers a pure servicizing business model, i.e., if
c
(
e
)≥C2(k(e)), then the adoption is higher than under pure sales. In addition, the pure servicizing
model leads to higher aggregate usage if c
(
e
)
>C3
(
k(e)
)
, and larger quantity of products if c
(
e
)
>
C4
(
k(e)
)
, where C3
(
k(e)
)
<C4
(
k(e)
)
.
Strong pooling decreases the total production cost, which allows the firm to charge a lower pay-
per-use price and further increase the adoption level by reaching inactive customers. For a higher
production cost, the firm has to charge a higher price to recoup it, lowering the adoption under the
pure sales model and both the adoption and individual usage under the servicizing model. However,
the increase in the production cost, and as an extension in the price, is less pronounced under
servicizing due to strong pooling. For that reason, the decrease in the adoption and individual
usage is also less pronounced. Therefore, when the production cost increases beyond a threshold,
C3
(
k(e)
)
, the aggregate usage is higher under pure servicizing than under pure sales.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 also suggests that even under strong pooling, a pure servicizing
model, where the firm pools the needs of all participating customers, may actually require a larger
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quantity of products than pure sales. This happens when the production cost is sufficiently high
(i.e., when c (e) > C4 (k(e))). In this case, the decrease in the adoption under pure servicizing is
much smaller than the decrease under pure sales, because the firm can better absorb the high
production costs under servicizing. Therefore, the adoption is much larger and the firm requires a
larger quantity of products to meet the customers’ usage needs even with strong pooling.
We next summarize the environmental performance of servicizing business models when they
are more profitable under strong pooling.
Corollary 2. Under strong pooling: A hybrid business model is always environmentally supe-
rior to pure sales. A pure servicizing business model is environmentally superior if c(e)<C3
(
k(e)
)
,
but environmentally inferior for products that have the majority of their impact in the use phase,
i.e., ω
.
= ηm
ηm+ηu
< ω2, if C3
(
k(e)
) ≤ c(e) ≤ C4(k(e)). If c(e) > C4(k(e)), then a pure servicizing
business model is always environmentally inferior to pure sales.
When pooling is strong, a servicizing business model may be environmentally inferior for products
such as servers, cars or washers that have the majority of their impact in the use phase (cf., Fujitsu
2010, Kobayashi 1997, Fishbein et al. 2000). It is also interesting to note that, while a servicizing
business model leads to higher environmental impact due to production but lower environmental
impact due to use under no pooling (see Corollary 1), under strong pooling it may actually lead
to lower environmental impact due to production but higher environmental impact due to use.
Corollary 2 also shows that despite strong pooling a pure servicizing business model can lead to
higher total environmental impact than pure sales. Therefore, pooling, in contrast to conventional
wisdom, can result in servicizing business models being environmentally inferior.
One may also expect that the environmental potential of servicizing would diminish under a
hybrid business model as compared to a pure servicizing model. However, the above result shows
that when pooling is strong, although the pure servicizing model can be environmentally inferior to
pure sales, a hybrid business model is always environmentally superior. This is because, as discussed
above, the sales option under the hybrid model reduces the efficacy of pooling and, therefore, limits
how much the firm can decrease its pay-per-use price. In sum, our results highlight the importance of
accounting for operational characteristics such as the strength of pooling and whether a servicizing
business model includes a sales option or not, while assessing the environmental performance of
servicizing business models.4
We next calibrate our model to illustrate the relative environmental performance of servicizing
business models observed in practice. The goal of this exercise is to highlight that the performance
4 We also find that when a servicizing business model is more profitable, it also leads to higher total customer surplus
(details available on request).
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of servicizing business models in practice may be contrary to conventional wisdom. In order to do
this, we focus on our two main examples, which capture the two extremes of pooling efficacy: i)
document management services such as those offered by Xerox, which represents the no pooling
case, and ii) cloud services such as those offered by IBM, which represents the strong pooling case.
For each of these cases, we estimate the production and operating costs, and the maximum
usage needs in the market. For brevity, we relegate the detailed description of the methods and
sources used for the calibration along with the resulting estimates to §A2 in the Appendix. To
calculate the production costs, we utilize the reported profit margins from the publicly available
financial statements of Xerox and IBM and the average market prices for different models of Xerox
multifunction printers and IBM servers. This provides us with a range of values for the production
cost, which allows us to discuss how the performance of servicizing may differ for low- versus high-
cost products. Using industry reports, we also calculate the operating cost by estimating the cost of
toner/ink and electricity per page for printers and the cost of electricity per GB stored for servers.
We determine an estimate for the maximum monthly print volume for Xerox’s document services
customers using the data from Ning et al. (2014) and for the maximum cloud storage needs based
on the plans offered by SugarSync, a commercial cloud storage provider. As our model parameters
are between zero and one, we normalize the estimates to fit our model. Given the lack of studies
estimating the change in usage per unit change in operating cost (b), we assume b= 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the firm’s optimal business model choice and the relative environmental
performance of servicizing by comparing the quantity of products and aggregate usage. For the
document management services case, the firm offers a hybrid model as long as the production cost
is not very high. Note from panels (a) and (b) that the hybrid model leads to larger quantity of
products but the aggregate usage is lower than pure sales. As printers have the majority of their
impact in the use phase, this implies that document management services such as those offered by
Xerox are environmentally superior. From panels (c) and (d) for the cloud services case, we find
that for low-cost servers, the firm offers a hybrid model and it leads to a lower quantity of products
and aggregate usage. For high-cost servers, we find that the firm offers a pure servicizing model
and it leads to higher quantity of products and aggregate usage. This implies that servicizing is
environmentally superior for low-cost servers but environmentally inferior for high-cost servers.
4.2 Product efficiency decisions
We next focus on the firm’s product efficiency choice. For analytical tractability, we use c(e)
.
= c0e
2
and k(e)
.
= k0(1− e) as the specifications for the production and operating costs, respectively.5 We
next analyze the effect of product efficiency on the customers’ usage under the different options.
5 We can numerically show that our structural results hold for k(e) = k0(1− e)2, which is convex in efficiency. Our
results also hold for a production cost specification quadratic in the quantity, which captures economies of scale.
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Figure 1 Comparisons for the quantity of products Qj and aggregate usage Ωj for the servicizing business model
(j = seγ) and the benchmark pure sales model (j = sa).
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Note. Solid black squares denote the pure sales model and gray circles denote a servicizing business model. Panels
(a)-(b) are based on the normalized estimates for document management services with γ = 1, k = 0.003 and b= 1.
The firm offers a hybrid business model below the dashed vertical line and pure sales above it. Panels (c)-(d) are
based on the normalized estimates for cloud services with γ = 2, k= 4.79× 10−5 and b= 1. The firm offers a hybrid
business model below the dashed vertical line and pure servicizing above it.
Proposition 5. Under the sales option, an individual customer’s usage always increases in the
product efficiency. The increase in the customer usage due to higher efficiency, is higher under
the sales option than under the servicizing option. If c0 > Ĉ
i
γ(k0), an individual customer’s usage
under the servicizing option actually decreases in the product efficiency, for i∈ {p,h}.
Higher product efficiency results in lower operating cost, which enables the firm to charge a
higher sales price for a more efficient product. However, under the sales option the customer’s usage,
q
∗
sa(θ;f
i∗
sa(e), e) = θ−bk(e), does not directly depend on the sales price, and for that reason it always
increases in the product efficiency. This is in line with conventional wisdom according to which, as
products become more efficient, customer usage increases. In other words, the rebound effect takes
place (Greening et al. 2000). However, under the servicizing option, if the production cost is high,
a more efficient product may lead to lower customer usage. The reason is that under the servicizing
option, customers’ usage, q
∗
se(θ;f
i∗
se(e), e) = θ− b
(
f i
∗
se(e) + k(e)
)
for i∈ {p,h}, depends on both the
operating cost and the pay-per-use price. The firm charges a higher pay-per-use price for a more
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efficient product in order to recoup the production cost. This implies that in addition to the direct
positive effect because of the lower operating cost, a higher efficiency exerts an indirect negative
effect on the customer usage. As the production cost increases, the firm charges an even higher
pay-per-use price. Therefore, if the production cost is sufficiently high, then the negative effect of
a higher pay-per-use price on the individual customer usage dominates. This leads customer usage
to decrease in product efficiency, which means that the rebound effect may not take place under
the servicizing option. This finding provides a novel mechanism that may deter the rebound effect
from taking place, and make servicizing business models environmentally superior.
We next focus on comparing the profit-maximizing efficiency choices between a servicizing busi-
ness model and pure sales model. The firm’s problem is to choose the product efficiency ep
∗
sa ∈ [0,1]
that maximizes Π˜psa under pure sales. We assume c0 <
1
2
to ensure that the pure sales model has a
strictly positive profit for all e ∈ [0,1]. For the sake of analytical tractability, we assume b= 1 for
the next result, which can be numerically shown to hold for any b > 0 (details available on request).
In general, the firm’s design problem is to choose the product efficiency e∗γ ∈ [0,1] that maximizes
Π˜∗γ(e), where Π˜
∗
γ(e) = max
{
Π˜psa(e), Π˜
p
seγ(e), Π˜
h
γ(e)
}
. To avoid uninteresting comparisons when the
firm chooses the pure sales model under no pooling, we restrict our attention to k0 <K1(c0), which
ensures that the hybrid business model is more profitable than pure sales for all e ∈ [0,1]. Under
strong pooling, we restrict our attention to k0 <K2(c0) for analytical tractability and brevity.
6
Based on the proposed arguments in practice, one would expect the firm to offer products with
higher efficiency under a servicizing business model. The rationale behind this argument is that the
firm has a greater incentive to reduce operating costs by providing products with higher efficiency
as its revenue is based on the customer usage. However, the next result shows that a servicizing
business model may actually lead to products with lower efficiency.
Proposition 6. Under no pooling, a servicizing business model leads to lower efficiency than
pure sales (i.e., e∗1 ≤ ep
∗
sa). However, under strong pooling, a servicizing business model leads to
higher efficiency than pure sales (i.e., ep
∗
sa ≤ e∗2).
A higher product efficiency leads to a lower operating cost and a higher unit production cost.
Therefore, the firm’s decision to invest in higher efficiency depends on the extent to which it benefits
from a higher aggregate usage (due to a lower operating cost) and the associated increase in the
total production cost. Under a servicizing business model, the firm directly benefits from a higher
aggregate usage because it directly increases the revenue. However, under sales the firm benefits
only indirectly from higher aggregate usage because its revenue does not directly depend on it.
6 It can be numerically shown that our results hold even when the conditions k0 <K1(c0) and k0 <K2(c0) are relaxed.
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Under no pooling, a servicizing business model leads to a larger quantity of products but lower
aggregate usage than pure sales (see Proposition 1). Although the firm would prefer to increase
the aggregate usage by increasing the efficiency, this would lead to a significantly higher total
production cost. The increase in the total production cost dominates, and for that reason the firm
chooses a lower efficiency for a servicizing business model under no pooling.
Strong pooling reduces the quantity of products required to meet customer needs and, conse-
quently, lowers the total production cost. This makes investing in efficiency more attractive for
the firm. Recall that when the unit production cost is low, a servicizing business model leads to
smaller quantity of products and lower aggregate usage than pure sales (see Propositions 3 and
4). This implies that for low production costs the firm has a greater incentive to invest in higher
efficiency under a servicizing business model in order to increase aggregate usage. As the unit
production cost increases, the firm charges a higher price. This lowers the total adoption under
both a pure sales and a servicizing business model. However, under a servicizing business model a
higher unit production cost also exerts a direct negative effect on the individual usage (this is not
the case under a pure sales model; see Lemma 1). For that reason, the firm’s incentive to increase
the aggregate usage is greater for a higher production cost. Therefore, the firm chooses a higher
product efficiency even when the quantity of products and the associated total production cost are
higher (see Proposition 4).
We next discuss the effect of the optimal product efficiency on the relative environmental perfor-
mance of servicizing business models. The environmental performance depends on the comparisons
of the quantity of products and aggregate usage at the optimal efficiencies and on how the per-unit
environmental impact depends on the product efficiency. While comparing the quantity of prod-
ucts and aggregate usage in this case is analytically intractable, we numerically verify that our
structural results regarding their comparisons continue to hold. In particular, under no pooling
as in Proposition 1, the hybrid business model leads to a larger quantity of products and lower
aggregate usage than pure sales. Similarly, under strong pooling as in Propositions 3 and 4, the
hybrid business model leads to a smaller quantity of products and aggregate usage, whereas the
pure servicizing model can lead to higher quantity of products and aggregate usage.
Note that the per-unit of usage impact, ηu, may be lower for a product with higher efficiency due
to the smaller amount of energy, raw materials, or resources required during its use. Recall that for
no pooling the aggregate usage is lower under a servicizing business model (see Proposition 1). In
addition, the firm chooses a lower efficiency under a servicizing business model (see Proposition 6),
which results in a higher ηu. This implies that under no pooling the relative environmental perfor-
mance of a servicizing business model worsens. Similarly, under strong pooling, the firm chooses a
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higher efficiency under a servicizing business model and therefore, its relative environmental per-
formance improves. The per-unit environmental impact due to production, ηm, may be higher for a
product with higher efficiency, as manufacturing the product may require more expensive material
and processing. The effect of this is that the relative environmental performance of a servicizing
business model improves under no pooling but worsens under strong pooling.
5. Model Extensions and Discussion of Assumptions
We now discuss the implications of relaxing some of the assumptions used in our main analysis
and provide extensions that capture additional considerations relevant to our context.
5.1 Results for a general γ ∈ (1,2).
Throughout our main analysis we focused on the two extreme cases of pooling represented by
γ = 1 (no pooling) and γ = 2 (strong pooling). While solving for the firm’s pricing and efficiency
decisions under a general γ ∈ (1,2) is analytically intractable, we numerically analyze the relative
performance of servicizing business models for the intermediate range of γ ∈ (1,2). The optimal
business model choice for a general γ can be structurally more complex than the two extremes
discussed in Propositions 1 and 3. Overall, the hybrid business model is optimal for low production
costs. The hybrid and pure servicizing models become more attractive for a stronger level of
pooling. The pure servicizing business model is optimal only when pooling is sufficiently strong and
production cost is high. As γ increases (i.e., as pooling becomes stronger), the optimal business
model choice may switch from the pure sales to the hybrid model and eventually to the pure
servicizing model.
With respect to the relative environmental performance of servicizing business models for a
general γ ∈ (1,2), we find the following: There exists a threshold value of γ below which the results
are structurally similar to our no pooling case (γ = 1) and above which they are structurally similar
to our strong pooling case (γ = 2). Figure 2 illustrates a representative example from our numerical
analysis. It can be seen from panels (a)-(c) that for lower values of γ (i.e., for values below the
dashed vertical line), the servicizing business model leads to a larger quantity of products but lower
aggregate usage and product efficiency than pure sales. This is similar to our results under the no
pooling case (see Propositions 1 and 6). For higher values of γ (i.e., for values above the dashed
vertical line), the hybrid business model leads to a smaller quantity of products and aggregate
usage but higher product efficiency than pure sales. This is similar to our strong pooling case (see
Propositions 3 and 6). It can be seen from panels (d)-(f) that for higher values of γ (above the
dashed vertical line), the hybrid model leads to a smaller quantity of products and aggregate usage
than pure sales, and the pure servicizing model leads to a smaller quantity of products but higher
aggregate usage. Both servicizing models lead to higher efficiency than pure sales. This is similar
to our results under the strong pooling case (see Propositions 3, 4 and 6).
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Figure 2 Comparisons for a general value of γ ∈ [1,2]. The dashed vertical line denotes the threshold value of
γ below which the results are similar to the no pooling case and above which they are similar to the
strong pooling case.
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Note. Solid black squares denote the pure sales business model and gray circles denote a servicizing business model.
In panels (a)-(c), c0 = 0.1, k0 = 0.05, b= 1, and the firm offers a hybrid business model for all γ. In panels (d)-(f),
c0 = 0.3, k0 = 0.8, b = 1, and the firm offers a pure sales model below the dashed line (γ < 1.7) and a servicizing
business model above it. In particular, the firm offers a hybrid model for 1.7≤ γ < 1.9 and a pure servicizing model
for 1.9≤ γ ≤ 2.
5.2 Alternative model of pooling.
In our main analysis, we capture the key characteristics of pooling with a parsimonious model
that maintains analytical tractability. We now consider a model of pooling using an alternative
queueing-based approach (cf., Bellos et al. 2013).
In particular, assume that the firm maintains a pool of Q products to ensure a service level
ρ ∈ (0,1), which is exogenous and chosen based on some external conditions such as an industry
standard. Let the size of the customer population be generalized to N > 1. Customers request the
use of a product according to a Poisson process. If a customer does not find a product available,
then his request is met the next time a product is available. The customer’s net utility from a usage
qse is given by Use(qse;θ, fse, e) = Vθ(qse) − b
(
k(e) + fse
)
qse. The optimal usage of an individual
customer remains the same as in our basic model, q∗se(θ;fse, e) = θ − b
(
k(e) + fse
)
. Assume that
each time a customer requests and receives a product, the expected usage is τ . If customers with
θ ∈ [Θj,Θi] choose the servicizing option, then the rate of requests faced by the firm is given by
λ=N
∫ Θi
Θj
q∗se(θ;fse,e)dθ
τ
.
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In this framework, the firm’s operational system resembles a closed queueing network with Q
jobs. Following the literature (see Whitt 1984, Toktay et al. 2000), an open-network counterpart
of the closed network can be constructed, in which case from Bellos et al. (2013), the quantity of
products required by the firm is then given by
Q= ρ
(
1
1− ρ +λτ
)
= ρ
(
1
1− ρ +N
∫ Θi
Θj
q∗se(θ;fse, e)dθ
)
= ρ
(
1
1− ρ +
N
(
nse(fse;e)
)2
2
)
.
It can be seen that the above specification has the same properties as the one used in our main
analysis, in that the quantity of products required is convex increasing in the adoption nse, and it
is also similar in structure to our special case of strong pooling (γ = 2).
5.3 Economies of scale in pooling.
The specification for the quantity of products in our main analysis assumes that the efficacy of
pooling decreases in the adoption (i.e., the quantity of products required is convex in the adoption).
One could also consider a situation where the firm enjoys economies of scale, in which case the
efficacy of pooling increases in the adoption level (i.e., the quantity of products required is concave
in the adoption). For example, this may happen if the increasing adoption faced by the firm stems
from the consolidation of multiple pools from different locations. While analyzing this case is
analytically intractable in our setting, we numerically investigate whether our results hold for such
a scenario. We do so by utilizing an alternative formulation, Qiseg(·) = nse(·)− (nse(·))
1
g+1
1
g+1
, which is
concave in the adoption level, and where g≥ 0 captures the strength of the pooling effect. Similar
to the specification used in our main analysis, the quantity of products required is increasing in
the adoption level and decreasing in the strength of pooling. The no pooling case is captured by
g→ 0 because then Qiseg(·)→ nse(·).
We utilize Qiseg(·) in our numerical analysis to analyze the effect of a concave pooling specification
on our results. For lower values of g (i.e., for weak pooling), we find that the results are structurally
similar to those of our no pooling case. That is, the hybrid business model leads to a larger quantity
of products, but lower aggregate usage and product efficiency (as in Propositions 1 and 6). For
higher values of g (i.e., when the pooling effect is stronger), we find that the hybrid model leads
to lower aggregate usage (as in Proposition 3 for our strong pooling case), but the quantity of
products can be larger than the benchmark of pure sales. The result that the pure servicizing model
can lead to higher aggregate usage and larger quantity of products still holds (as in Proposition 4).
However, in the presence of economies of scale, the aggregate usage and quantity of products under
pure servicizing is higher for smaller values of the production cost. This implies that economies of
scale worsens the relative environmental performance of servicizing business models. The reason is
that as the efficacy of pooling increases in the adoption level, the firm has a greater incentive to
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further reach customers with lower usage needs. This leads to greater adoption, a larger quantity
of products, and consequently, higher total production cost. As a result, in contrast to Proposition
6, the product efficiency can be lower under a servicizing business model even with strong pooling.
Overall, these findings imply that our main results regarding the detrimental effect of pooling
continue to hold in the presence of economies of scale, which further worsens the environmental
performance of servicizing.
5.4 Alternative utility functions.
In our main analysis, the functional form for customers’ utility is quadratic in usage, which leads
the optimal usage to be linear in the pay-per-use price (see Lemma 1). This allows us to obtain the
optimal decisions in an analytically tractable manner. We now discuss the robustness of our results
when the customers’ utility is such that the resulting optimal usage is nonlinear in the pay-per-use
price. In particular, we consider the net utility of customer θ under the sales and servicizing option
to be U isa(q
i
sa;θ, f
i
sa, e) = qsa(θ−k)z+1− (q
i
sa)
2
2
−f isa and U ise(qise;θ, f ise, e) = qse(θ−f ise−k)z+1− (q
i
se)
2
2
,
where z ≥ 0.7 We obtain qi∗sa(θ;f isa, e) =
(
θ − bk(e))z+1 and qi∗se(θ;f ise, e) = (θ − b(f ise + k(e)))z+1,
which are nonlinear for z > 0. Given that this renders our analysis analytically intractable, we
numerically investigate whether our results hold for functional forms with z ∈ {1,2} (i.e., quadratic
and cubic optimal usage functions). We find that our results in Proposition 4 regarding the environ-
mental performance of pure servicizing business models and our results in Proposition 6 regarding
the comparison of optimal efficiencies continue to hold. However, the environmental performance
of hybrid business models can worsen. Specifically, in contrast to Propositions 1 and 3, the hybrid
business model can lead to higher aggregate usage and larger quantity of products. This is because
the pay-per-use price now has a nonlinear effect on the optimal usage, leading the firm to choose
a lower price to compensate customers, which results in a larger adoption.
5.5 A lower operating cost under servicizing.
Our model assumes that customers incur the operating cost, k(e), under both the sales and the
servicizing option. However, in practice the firm may bear the operating cost under the servicizing
option. Moreover, the operating cost may be lower when faced by the firm, than when faced by
the customers. This may be due to economies of scale or because the firm has greater expertise in
activities such as maintenance and repair. In this case, a lower operating cost will allow the firm to
charge a lower pay-per-use price which in turn will increase adoption and aggregate usage. There-
fore, although a servicizing business model will be relatively more profitable, its environmental
performance will deteriorate.
7 The case with z = 0 is identical to the functional form used in our main analysis.
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6. Conclusions
Several environmental groups and agencies have argued that servicizing can be environmentally
superior to sales (White et al. 1999, Fischer et al. 2012). While these claims have gained trac-
tion in practice, the environmental potential of such models is not clear (cf., U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 2009, p. 19). Motivated by this, our research offers insights for firms and envi-
ronmental agencies regarding when and why a servicizing business model is both more profitable
and environmentally beneficial.
We show that the environmental performance of servicizing depends on structural characteristics
such as pay-per-use pricing and degree of pooling, and on whether the firm offers servicizing through
a hybrid or pure servicizing model. Under no pooling, a hybrid business model leads to a larger
quantity of products but lower aggregate usage. Therefore, it is environmentally superior only for
products that have the majority of their environmental impact in the use phase. In contrast, under
strong pooling, a hybrid model is environmentally superior to pure sales. Interestingly, a pure
servicizing model is environmentally inferior for high production costs because it leads to a larger
quantity of products, even with strong pooling. We also show that, in contrast to arguments in
practice, a firm offers products with higher efficiency only under servicizing models with strong
pooling. Finally, we identify a novel mechanism regarding why servicizing can be environmentally
superior. Under servicizing, a more efficient product can actually lead to lower customer usage,
which implies that servicizing may act as a mechanism to moderate the rebound effect.
In order to capture the main trade-offs faced by the firm when considering servicizing we devel-
oped a parsimonious model, which focused on pay-per-use pricing, pooling, and whether both sales
and servicizing options are offered, as the most common operational characteristics of servicizing
models. In practice, the firm’s and customers’ decisions under a servicizing business model may be
affected by additional factors. For example, there can be uncertainty in customers’ usage needs,
inconvenience costs associated with having to wait for a product to become available, and “anxi-
eties” associated with the possibility of the product not being functional or available when required.
These factors can make it important for the firm to also account for operational considerations
such as risk pooling and demand-supply mismatch. A promising direction for future research is to
assess how these factors influence the economic and environmental performance of servicizing.
In practice, firms can possibly enjoy lower product recovery and reuse costs under servicizing as
they maintain ownership of the products. This can be interpreted in our model as a lower unit pro-
duction cost for the units provided through servicizing, which would lead to higher adoption and
aggregate usage, and consequently improve the relative profitability but worsen the relative envi-
ronmental performance of servicizing. Finally, although we did not consider competition between
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firms, we can conjecture about its effect on our results. In particular, we expect that competi-
tion will put downward pressure on the firms’ pricing decisions, resulting in greater adoption and
usage. Thus, competition will lead to higher total environmental impact under each of the busi-
ness models. We also expect servicizing business models to be more attractive to a firm than pure
sales because pooling helps reduce the production cost and maintain profit margins. Nevertheless,
understanding how competition influences the relative environmental performance of servicizing
remains a promising direction for future research.
Appendix
A1. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We first begin by determining a customer’s optimal usage decision under
the sales and servicizing options. The utility-maximization problem of a customer θ under the
sales option is given by maxqisa≥0U
i
sa(q
i
sa;θ, f
i
sa, e) =
1
b
(
θqisa−
(
qisa
)2
2
)
− k(e)qisa − f isa, where
U isa(q
i
sa;θ, f
i
sa, e) is strictly concave in q
i
sa. Solving the first-order condition, we obtain q
i∗
sa(θ;f
i
sa, e) =
θ−bk(e), and U isa(qi
∗
sa;θ, f
i
sa, e) =
(
θ−bk(e)
)2
2b
−f isa. The utility-maximization problem of a customer θ
under servicizing is given by maxqise≥0U
i
se(q
i
se;θ, f
i
se, e) =
1
b
(
θqise−
(
qise
)2
2
)
− (f ise + k(e))qise, where
U ise(q
i
se;θ, f
i
se, e) is strictly concave in q
i
se. Solving the first-order condition, we obtain q
i∗
se(θ;f
i
se, e) =
θ− b(f ise + k(e)), and U ise(qi
∗
se;θ, f
i
se, e) =
(
θ−b(k(e)+fise)
)2
2b
.
Under the pure sales model, the marginal customer who is indifferent between purchasing a
product and remaining active is determined by solving Upsa(q
p∗
sa ;θ, f
p
sa, e) = 0 for θ, which gives θ=
Θpsa
.
=
√
2bfpsa + bk(e). As Upsa(q
p∗
sa ;θ, f
p
sa, e) is increasing in θ, customers with θ ∈ [Θpsa,1] purchase
a product and the rest remain inactive. The resulting adoption is given by npsa(f
p
sa;e) = 1− bk(e)−√
2bfpsa. Note that qp
∗
sa is always positive for θ ≥Θpsa. Similarly, under the pure servicizing model,
the marginal customer who is indifferent between participating and remaining active is determined
by solving Upse(q
p∗
se ;θ, f
p
se, e) = 0 for θ, which gives θ = Θ
p
se
.
= b(fpse + k(e)). As U
h
se(q
h∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e) is
increasing in θ, customers with θ ∈ [Θpse,1] choose servicizing and the rest remain inactive. The
resulting adoption is given by npse(f
p
se;e) = 1− bk(e)− bfpse. Note that qp
∗
se ≥ 0 for θ≥Θpse.
Under the hybrid business model, customers choose between the sales and servicizing options,
or remain inactive. The net utility from each of these options is given by: Uhsa(q
h∗
sa ;θ, f
h
sa, e) =(
θ−bk(e)
)2
2b
− fhsa, Uhse(qh
∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e) =
(
θ−bk(e)−bfhse
)2
2b
and 0, respectively. It is straightforward to show
that Uhsa(q
h∗
sa ;θ, f
h
sa, e) − Uhse(qh
∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e), and U
h
se(q
h∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e) are strictly increasing in θ. This
implies that customers who choose the sales option have higher θ than those who choose the
servicizing option, who in turn have higher θ than those who remain inactive. Let the marginal
customer who is indifferent between the sales and the servicizing option and, between servicizing
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and remaining inactive be denoted by Θh1 and Θ
h
2 , respectively. The values of Θ
h
1 and Θ
h
2 are found
by solving Uhsa(q
h∗
sa ;θ, f
h
sa, e) =U
h
se(q
h∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e) and U
h
se(q
h∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e) = 0 for θ, which gives θ= Θ
h
1
.
=
2fhsa+2bk(e)f
h
se+b(f
h
se)
2
2fhse
and θ = Θh2
.
= b(fhse + k(e)). Therefore, customers in θ ∈ (Θh1 ,1] choose sales,
customers in θ ∈ [Θh2 ,Θh1 ] choose servicizing and, customers in θ ∈ [0,Θh2) remain inactive. Note that
Uhsa(q
h∗
sa ;θ, f
h
sa, e)≥ 0 for all θ ≥Θh1 and Uhse(qh
∗
se ;θ, f
h
se, e)≥ 0 for all θ ≥Θh2 . The adoption of sales
under the hybrid model is given by nhsa(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e)
.
= 1−Θh1 =
fhse
(
2−2bk(e)−bfhse
)
−2fhsa
2fhse
and that of servi-
cizing is given by nhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
2fhsa−b(fhse)2
2fhse
. Finally, note that for nhsa(f
h
sa, f
h
se, e), n
h
se(f
h
sa, f
h
se, e)>
0, we need b(f
h
se)
2
2
< fhsa <
fhse
(
2−2bk(e)−bfhse
)
2
.
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. In the interest of expositional brevity, we suppress
the dependence of operating and production costs on the efficiency. In addition, we focus on no
pooling and suppress the notation in the subscript for γ = 1.
Under pure sales, the firm’s pricing problem is given by maxfpsa Π
p
sa(f
p
sa;e) =
(
fpsa−c
)
npsa(f
p
sa;e) =(
fpsa − c
)(
1 − bk(e) −
√
2bfpsa
)
. Πpsa(f
p
sa;e) is strictly concave in f
p
sa because Π
p
′′
sa (f
p
sa;e) =
−√b(3fpsa+c)
2
√
2(f
p
sa)
3/2 < 0. Solving the first-order condition, we obtain f
p∗
sa (e) =
(1−bk)2+3bc+(1−bk)
√
(1−bk)2+6cb
9b
>
0. Substituting the optimal price, we get n˜psa(e)
.
= npsa(f
p∗
sa (e);e) =
2(1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
3
(where Q˜psa(e) = n˜
p
sa(e)), Ω˜
p
sa(e)
.
= Ωpsa(f
p∗
sa (e);e) =
9(1−bk)2−
(
(1−bk)+
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
)2
18
and, Π˜psa(e)
.
=
Πpsa(f
p∗
sa (e);e) =
(
2(1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
)(
−6bc+(1−bk)
(
1−bk+
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
))
27b
. Note that Π˜psa(e), n˜
p
sa(e) > 0
if and only if c < (1−bk)
2
2b
.
Under pure servicizing, the firm’s pricing problem is given by maxfpse Π
p
se(f
p
se;e) = f
p
seΩ
p
se(f
p
se;e)−
cQpse(f
p
se;e), where Ω
p
se(f
p
se;e) =
∫ 1
Θ
p
se
qp
∗
se (θ)dθ =
(1−bfpse−bk)2
2
and Qpse(f
p
se;e) = n
p
se(f
p
se;e) = (1 −
bfpse − bk). The firm’s profit is positive if and only if F1 .= (1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2−8bc
2b
< fpse < F2
.
=
(1−bk)+
√
(1−bk)2−8bc
2b
, where F1 < F2 can hold if and only if c <
(1−bk)2
8b
(
< (1−bk)
2
2b
)
. The solution to
the first-order condition yields only one local optima such that the firm’s profit is positive, given
by fpse = F
A .=
2(1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2−6bc
3b
, which is real-valued under the condition for positive profitabil-
ity (c < (1−bk)
2
8b
). As Πp
′′
se (F
A;e) = −√(1− bk)2− 6bc < 0, Πpse(F1;e) = 0, and Πpse(F2;e) = 0, FA
is the unique maximizer, i.e., fp
∗
se (e) = F
A .=
2(1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2−6bc
3b
. At the optimal price, n˜pse(e)
.
=
npse(f
p∗
se ;e) =
1−bk+
√
(1−bk)2−6bc
3
(where Q˜pse(e) = n˜
p
se(e)), Ω˜
p
se(e)
.
= Ωpse(f
p∗
se ;e) =
(
1−bk+
√
(1−bk)2−6bc
)2
18
and Π˜pse(e)
.
= Πpse(f
p∗
se ;e) =
(
−12bc+
(
1−bk
)(
1−bk+
√
(1−bk)2−6bc
))(
1−bk+
√
(1−bk)2−6bc
)
54b
.
Under the hybrid business model, the firm’s pricing problem is given by maxfhsa,fhse Π
h(fhsa, f
h
se;e) =
Πhsa(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) + Π
h
se(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) = (f
h
sa− c)nhsa(fhsa, fhse;e) +fhseΩhse(fhsa, fhse;e)− cnhse(fhsa, fhse;e), where
Ωhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
(
2fhsa−b(fhse)2
)2
8(fhse)
2 , n
h
sa(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
fhse(2−2bk−bfhse)−2fhsa
2fhse
, and nhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
2fhsa−b(fhse)2
2fhse
.
The solution to the first-order conditions yields only one local optima that can be a max-
imizer, given by fh
∗
sa =
2
(
60bc+(1−bk)(26(1−bk)+
√
(1−bk)2−30bc)
)
225b
and fh
∗
se =
2
(
4(1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
15b
,
which is a maximizer if and only if c < (1−bk)
2
30b
. In addition, nhsa(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e), n
h
se(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) >
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0 holds only if c < (1−bk)
2
30b
. Therefore, it is the unique maximizer under this condition.
At the optimal prices, we have n˜hsa(e)
.
= nhsa(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
(
4(1−bk)−
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
15
, n˜hse(e)
.
=
nhse(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
(
(1−bk)+
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
5
, Ω˜hse
.
= Ωhse(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
(
(1−bk)
(
(1−bk)+
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
−15bc
)
25
,
Ω˜hsa
.
= Ωhsa(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
(
30bc+(1−bk)
(
103(1−bk)−22
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
))
450
, and Π˜h(e)
.
= Πh(fh
∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
2(1−bk)2
(
26(1−bk)+
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
−15bc
(
21(1−bk)+4
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
675b
. The total adoption (and thus the
quantity of products) and aggregate usage are given by Q˜h(e) = n˜h(e)
.
= n˜hsa(e) + n˜
h
se(e) =(
7(1−bk)+2
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
15
and Ω˜h(e)
.
= Ω˜hsa(e) + Ω˜
h
se(e) =
(
(1−bk)
(
121(1−bk)−4
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
−240bc
)
450
.
We now examine the firm’s optimal choice of business model under no pooling. Recall that the
hybrid business model is valid (i.e., n˜hse, n˜
h
sa > 0) only if c <
(1−bk)2
30b
. The pure servicizing model and
pure sales model lead to strictly positive profit only if c < (1−bk)
2
8b
, and c < (1−bk)
2
2b
, respectively. We
first begin by comparing the profit under the pure sales and pure servicizing models. Π˜psa− Π˜pse is
increasing in c because d(Π˜
p
sa−Π˜pse)
dc
=
−1+bk+
√
(1−bk)2−6bc+
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
3
> 0, and zero at c= 0, which
implies that Π˜psa ≥ Π˜pse. To compare the profit between the hybrid and pure sales model, let z1(c) .=
Π˜h− Π˜psa, where z1(c) is decreasing in c because dz1(c)dc =
3(1−bk)−2
√
(1−bk)2−30bc−5
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
15
< 0 for
c≤ (1−bk)2
30b
, positive at c= 0 and negative at c= (1−bk)
2
30b
. This implies that there exists a threshold
C1(k) obtained by solving z1(c) = 0, such that if c <C1(k)
(
< (1−bk)
2
30b
)
, then z1(c)> 0 or Π˜
h > Π˜psa,
otherwise z1(c)≤ 0 or Π˜h ≤ Π˜psa.
We next compare the adoption, quantity of products, and aggregate usage between the hybrid
business model and pure sales, when the hybrid business model is more profitable, i.e., c <C1(k).
Q˜h − Q˜psa is decreasing in c as d(Q˜
h−Q˜psa)
dc
= b
(
1√
(1−bk)2+6bc
− 2√
(1−bk)2−30bc
)
< 0 for c < (1−bk)
2
30b
, and
given by (
√
30−3)(1−bk)
15
> 0 at c = (1−bk)
2
30b
. Therefore, Q˜h − Q˜psa > 0 for all c < C1(k). Ω˜psa − Ω˜h
is decreasing in c as d(Ω˜
p
sa−Ω˜h)
dc
=
2b(−1+bk+4
√
(1−bk)2−30bc)
15
√
(1−bk)2−30bc
+ b(−1+bk)
3
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
− b
3
< 0, and given by
(57−10√30)(1−bk)2
450
> 0 at c= (1−bk)
2
30
. Therefore, Ω˜psa− Ω˜h > 0 for all c <C1(k), proving Proposition 1.
To prove Corollary 1, let Eh = ηmQ˜
h + ηuΩ˜
h, Epsa = ηmQ˜
p
sa + ηuΩ˜
p
sa, and z2(ω) =
E
p
sa−Eh
ηm+ηu
= ω
(
Q˜psa(e)− Q˜h(e)
)
+ (1 − ω)
(
Ω˜psa(e)− Ω˜h(e)
)
, where ω
.
= ηm
ηm+ηu
∈ [0,1]. z′2(ω) =(
Q˜psa(e)− Q˜h(e)
)
+
(
Ω˜h(e)− Ω˜psa(e)
)
< 0, z2(0) = Ω˜
p
sa(e)− Ω˜h(e)> 0, and z2(1) = Q˜psa(e)− Q˜h(e)<
0 (from Proposition 1). Therefore, there exists a unique value ω = ω1 such that z2(ω) = 0. This
implies that if ω >ω1, then E
p
sa <E
h. Otherwise, Epsa ≥Eh.
Proof of Propositions 2-4 and Corollary 2. We now focus on strong pooling and suppress
the notation in the subscript for γ = 2. Under pure servicizing, the firm’s pricing problem is
given by maxfpse Π
p
se(f
p
se;e) = f
p
seΩ
p
se(f
p
se;e)− cQpse(fpse;e), where Ωpse(fpse;e) =Qpse(fpse;e) =
(
n
p
se
)2
2
=
(1−bfpse−bk)2
2
, which is positive only if b(fpse + k) < 1. Therefore, for positive profit, we require
c < fpse <
1−bk
b
, which holds if and only if b(c + k) < 1. There is a unique solution to the first-
order condition given by fpse = F
B = 1+2bc−bk
3b
∈ [c, 1−bk
b
]. Πpse(F
B) > 0 and Πp
′′
se (F
B;e) = −b(1 −
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bc− bk)< 0. Therefore, FB is the unique maximizer, and let fp∗se (e) .= FB. At the optimal price,
Q˜pse(e)
.
=Qpse(f
p∗
se ;e) =
2(1−bc−bk)2
9
, Ω˜pse(e)
.
= Ωpse(f
p∗
se ;e) =
2(1−bc−bk)2
9
, n˜pse(e)
.
= npse(f
p∗
se ;e) =
2(1−bc−bk)
3
,
and Π˜pse(e) =
2(1−bc−bk)3
27b
.
Under the hybrid business model, the firm’s pricing problem is maxfhsa,fhse Π
h(fhsa, f
h
se;e) =
(fhsa − c)Qhsa(fhsa, fhse;e) +fhseΩhse(fhsa, fhse;e) −cQhse(fhsa, fhse;e), where Ωhse(fhsa, fhse;e) = (2f
h
sa−bfh
2
se )
2
8fh
2
se
,
Qhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
(nhse(f
h
sa,f
h
se,e))
2
2
, nhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
2fhsa−bfh
2
se
2fhse
, and nhsa(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) =
fhse(2−2bk−bfhse)−2fhsa
2fhse
.
The solution to the first-order conditions yields only one potential local maximizer
that satisfies the conditions for nhse(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e), n
h
sa(f
h
sa, f
h
se;e) > 0, given by f
h∗
sa (e) =(
−118(bc)2+3(1−bk)
(
1−bk+
√
24(bc)2+bc(6−16bk)+(1−bk)2
)
+bc
(
−17+24
√
24(bc)2+bc(6−16bk)+(1−bk)2+52bk
))
25b
and
fh
∗
se (e) =
(
1−2bc−bk+
√
24(bc)2+(1−bk)2+bc(6−16bk)
)
5b
, which is a maximizer if and only if c <
C2(k)
.
=
3
√
1+8(bk)2−1−8bk
8b
. nhsa(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e), n
h
se(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) > 0 if and only if c < C2(k). There-
fore, under this condition, it is the unique maximizer. At the optimal prices, we have
n˜hsa(e)
.
= nhsa(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
(
3
√
(1−bk)2+24(bc)2+bc(6−16bk)−2(1−bk)−16bc
)
5
(where Q˜hsa = n˜
h
sa) and
n˜hse(e)
.
= nhse(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) =
2
(
3(1−bk)+9bc−2
√
(1−bk)2+24(bc)2+bc(6−16bk)
)
5
. Let Ω˜hse(e)
.
= Ωhse(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e),
Ω˜hsa(e)
.
= Ωhsa(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e), Q˜
h
se(e)
.
= Qhse(f
h∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e), and Π˜
h(e)
.
= Πh(fh
∗
sa , f
h∗
se ;e) (expres-
sions not provided for brevity). The total adoption and aggregate usage are given by
n˜h
.
= n˜hsa(e) + n˜
h
se(e) =
(
4(1−bk)+2bc−
√
(1−bk)2+bc(6−16bk)+24(bc)2
)
5
and Ω˜h
.
= Ω˜hsa(e) + Ω˜
h
se(e) =
236(bc)2−(1−bk)
(
−19(1−bk)+6
√
24(bc)2+bc(6−16bk)+(1−bk)2
)
−2bc
(
−17+52bk+24
√
24(bc)2+bc(6−16bk)+(1−bk)2
)
50
.
We now examine the firm’s optimal choice of business model under strong pooling. Recall that
the hybrid business model is valid (i.e., n˜hsa, n˜
h
se > 0) only if c < C2(k) (<
(1−bk)2
2b
). The pure servi-
cizing model and pure sales model lead to strictly positive profit only if c < 1−bk
b
, and c < (1−bk)
2
2b
,
respectively. We first begin by comparing the profit between the hybrid and pure sales models.
Π˜h−Π˜psa is increasing in c because d(Π˜
h−Π˜psa)
dc
> 0 (expression not provided for brevity) for c <C2(k),
and given by 4(1−bk)
3
675
> 0 at c= 0. This implies that Π˜h > Π˜psa for c <C2(k). Similarly, Π˜
h− Π˜pse is
decreasing in c for c <C2(k) and positive at c=C2(k). Therefore, Π˜
h > Π˜pse for c <C2(k). Finally,
we compare the pure sales and pure servicizing models for c∈ [C2(k), (1−bk)
2
2b
]. Π˜pse− Π˜psa is strictly
concave in c because d
2(Π˜
p
se−Π˜psa)
dc2
= 4b(1−b(c+k))
9
− 1√
(1−bk)2+6bc
< 0 for c ∈ [C2(k), (1−bk)
2
2b
], positive at
c=C2(k) and c=
(1−bk)2
2b
. This implies that Π˜pse > Π˜
p
sa for c∈ [C2(k), (1−bk)
2
2b
]. Finally, at c=C2(k),
we have that Π˜h1 < 0< Π˜
p
sa as
(1−bk)2
30b
<C2(k)<
(1−bk)2
2b
. Because Π˜h1 < Π˜
p
sa if and only if c > C1(k),
we have that C1(k)<C2(k). This proves Proposition 2.
We next compare the hybrid and pure servicizing business models with the pure sales model.
First, we focus on the case where the hybrid business model is more profitable, i.e., c < C2(k).
n˜psa− n˜h is decreasing in c because d(n˜
p
sa−n˜h)
dc
< 0 (expression not provided for brevity) for c <C2(k),
and given by −4(1−bk)
15
< 0 at c= 0. Therefore, n˜psa < n˜
h for c < C2(k). To compare the quantity of
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products, Q˜psa− Q˜h 6= 0 for c <C2(k) (i.e., do not intersect) and given by 2(1−bk)(2+3bk)75 > 0 at c= 0.
Therefore, Q˜psa > Q˜
h for all c < C2(k). Finally, Ω˜
p
sa − Ω˜h 6= 0 for c < C2(k) (i.e., do not intersect)
and given by 4(1−bk)
2
225
> 0 at c= 0. Therefore, Ω˜psa > Ω˜
h for all c <C2(k). This proves Proposition 3.
Next, we focus on the case where the pure servicizing business model is more profitable, i.e.,
c ≥ C2(k). Note that n˜psa > n˜pse for all c ∈
[
C2(k),
(1−bk)2
2b
)
. To compare the aggregate usage, let
z3(c)
.
= Ω˜psa(e)− Ω˜pse(e) = −4(bc)
2+bc(2−8bk)+3(1−bk)2−2(1−bk)
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
18
, which decreases in c. In addi-
tion, z3
(
C2(k)
)
> 0 and z3
(
(1−bk)2
2b
)
= −(1−bk
2)2
18
< 0 for all k ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, there exists a
unique value c = C3(k), such that z
′
3(c) = 0, where C3(k) > 0. If c ≤ C3(k), then z3(c) ≥ 0 and
Ω˜psa(e)≥ Ω˜pse(e). Otherwise, Ω˜psa(e)< Ω˜pse(e). Note that Q˜psa− Q˜pse is decreasing in c as d(Q˜
p
sa−Q˜pse)
dc
=
b
(
−3+2
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
)
3
√
(1−bk)2+6bc
< 0 for c < (1−bk)
2
2b
, it is positive at c= 0 and negative at c= (1−bk)
2
2b
. This implies
that there exists a threshold c = C4(k) obtained by solving Q˜
p
sa = Q˜
p
se, such that if c < C4(k),
then Q˜psa > Q˜
p
se, otherwise Q˜
p
sa ≤ Q˜pse, where C4(k)< (1−bk)
2
2b
for all k < 1. Finally, as Q˜psa > Q˜
p
se for
c <C3(k), we have that C3(k)<C4(k). This proves Proposition 4.
To prove Corollary 2, let Eh = ηmQ˜
h + ηuΩ˜
h, Epse = ηmQ˜
p
se + ηuΩ˜
p
se, and E
p
sa = ηmQ˜
p
sa + ηuΩ˜
p
sa.
First, we focus on the case where the hybrid servicizing model is more profitable, i.e., c < C2(k).
To compare its environmental impact with that under pure sales model, note that Epsa − Eh =
ηm(Q˜
p
sa− Q˜h) + ηu(Ω˜psa− Ω˜h)> 0 because Q˜psa > Q˜h and Ω˜psa > Ω˜h (from Proposition 3). Therefore,
if c < C2(k), then E
p
sa >E
h. Next, we focus on the case where the pure servicizing model is more
profitable, i.e., c ≥ C2(k). Let z4(ω) = E
p
sa−Epse
ηm+ηu
= ω
(
Q˜psa(e)− Q˜pse(e)
)
+ (1− ω)
(
Ω˜psa(e)− Ω˜pse(e)
)
,
where ω
.
= ηm
ηm+ηu
. If c ∈ [C2(k),C3(k)), then as above we have that Epsa > Epse because Q˜psa(e) >
Q˜pse(e) and Ω˜
p
sa(e)> Ω˜
p
se(e) (from Proposition 4). If c ∈ [C3(k),C4(k)], then we have that z
′
4(ω) =(
Q˜psa(e)− Q˜pse(e)
)
+
(
Ω˜pse(e)− Ω˜psa(e)
)
> 0, z4(0) = Ω˜
p
sa(e) − Ω˜pse(e) < 0, and z4(1) = Q˜psa(e) −
Q˜pse(e) > 0, because Ω˜
p
se(e) > Ω˜
p
sa(e) and Q˜
p
sa(e) > Q˜
h(e) (from Proposition 4). Therefore, there
exists a unique value ω = ω2 such that z4(ω) = 0. This implies that if ω < ω2, then E
p
sa < E
p
se,
otherwise Epsa ≥Epse. Finally, if c∈
[
C4(k),
(1−bk)2
2b
]
, then we have Epsa <E
p
se because Q˜
p
sa(e)< Q˜
p
se(e)
and Ω˜psa(e)< Ω˜
p
se(e) (from Proposition 4).
Proof of Proposition 5.A customer’s usage under the sales option is qi
∗
sa(θ;f
i∗
sa, e) = θ − bk(e),
for i ∈ {p,h}, which is increasing in e as k(e) is decreasing in e. We first focus on servicizing
under no pooling (γ = 1). For pure servicizing, dq
p∗
se (θ;f
p∗
se ,e)
de
< 0 only if c0 > Ĉ
p
1 (k0)
.
=
2k0(1−bk0)+bek20
6e
.
Moreover, dq
i∗
sa(θ;f
i∗
sa ,e)
de
− dqp
∗
se (θ;f
p∗
se ,e)
de
=
6bc0e+bk0(−1+bk0(1−e))+2bk0
√
(1−bk0(1−e))2−6bc0e2
3
√
(1−bk0(1−e))2−6bc0e2
which is positive.
For the hybrid model, dq
h∗
se (θ;f
h∗
se ,e)
de
= bk0 +
2
15
(− 4bk0 + −30bc0e+bk0−(1−e)bk20√−30bc0e2+(1−bk0(1−e))2 ), which is negative
only if c0 > Ĉ
h
1 (k0) (expression not provided for brevity). Moreover,
dqi
∗
sa(θ;f
i∗
sa ,e)
de
− dqp
∗
se (θ;f
p∗
se ,e)
de
=
2
15
(
4bk0 +
30bc0e−bk0+(1−e)(bk0)2√
−30bc0e2+(1−bk0(1−e))2
)
, which is always positive for c(e)<C1
(
k(e)
)
.
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We now focus on servicizing with strong pooling (γ = 2). For pure servicizing,
dq
p∗
se (θ;f
p∗
se ,e)
de
= 2b(k0−2c0e)
3
, which is negative if and only if c0 > Ĉ
p
2 (k0)
.
= k0
2e
. Moreover,
dqi
∗
sa(θ;f
i∗
sa ,e)
de
− dqp
∗
se (θ;f
p∗
se ,e)
de
= b(4c0e+k0)
3
> 0. For the hybrid model, dq
h∗
se (θ;f
h∗
se ,e)
de
= b
5
(
4(c0e +
k0) +
6c0e(1+8bc0e
2)+k0+8bc0ek0(−2+3e)−bk20(1−e)√
24(bc0)2e4+(1−bk0(1−e))2+2bc0e2(3−8bk0(1−e))
)
, which is negative if c0 > Ĉ
h
2 (k0) (expres-
sion not provided for brevity). Moreover, dq
i∗
sa(θ;f
i∗
sa ,e)
de
− dqh
∗
se (θ;f
h∗
se ,e)
de
= b
5
( − 4c0e + k0 +
6c0e(1+8bc0e
2)+k0+8bc0ek0(−2+3e)−bk20(1−e)√
24b2c20e
4+(1−bk0(1−e))2+2bc0e2(3−8bk0(1−e))
)
, which can be shown to be positive for c(e)<C2
(
k(e)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let b= 1. We first solve for the optimal efficiency under our benchmark
case of the pure sales model. We assume c0 < 1/2 to ensure that the firm has positive profit for all
e∈ [0,1]. The firm’s problem is given by max0≤epsa≤1 Π˜p
∗
sa(e
p
sa). If c0 <
k0(2+k0)
6
, then Π˜p
∗
sa(e
p
sa) increases
in epsa for 0≤ epsa ≤ 1, which implies that ep
∗
sa = 1. If
k0(2+k0)
6
≤ c0 < 12 , Π˜p
∗
sa(e
p
sa) increases in e
p
sa for
epsa ∈
[
0, 2k0(2−k0)
3(2c0−k20)
)
and decreases in epsa for e
p
sa ∈
[
2k0(2−k0)
3(2c0−k20)
,1
]
, and consequently ep
∗
sa =
2k0(2−k0)
3(2c0−k20)
. In
sum, if c0 <
k0(2+k0)
6
, then ep
∗
sa = 1. Otherwise, e
p∗
sa =
2k0(2−k0)
3(2c0−k20)
.
We now solve the firm’s optimal efficiency choice, when it is optimal to offer a servicizing business
model. We first focus on the case with no pooling. Recall that the firm either offers a hybrid
business model or a pure sales model. In order to avoid the uninteresting comparison when the firm
prefers to offer a pure sales model, we assume k0 <K1(c0)
.
= 1−√30c, which ensures that the firm
prefers to offer a hybrid business model for all e∈ [0,1], i.e., the condition c(e)<C1
(
k(e)
)
holds for
all e∈ [0,1]. The firm’s problem is then given by max0≤e1≤1 Π˜∗1(e) = Π˜h
∗
1 (e). If c0 ≤C5γ=1(k0), then
Π˜h
∗
1 (e1) increases in e1 for all 0≤ e1 ≤ 1, which implies that e∗1 = 1. Otherwise, Π˜h
∗
1 (e1) increases in
e1 for e1 ∈ [0, ex] and decreases thereafter, and consequently, e∗1 = ex (expression not provided for
brevity). Therefore, e∗1 = 1 if c0 ≤C5γ=1(k0), and e∗1 = ex otherwise. We next compare e∗1 with ep
∗
sa.
Under k0 <K1(c0), we have C5γ=1(k0) <
k0(2+k0)
6
. If c0 <
k0(2+k0)
6
, then ep
∗
sa = 1 and e
∗
1 ≤ 1, which
implies ep
∗
sa1 ≥ e∗1. If c0 > k0(2+k0)6 , then ep
∗
sa, e
∗
1 < 1. Under these conditions, we have e
∗
1 < e
p∗
sa.
We next focus on the case with strong pooling. Recall that for c(e)<C2
(
k(e)
)
, the firm offers
a hybrid servicizing model, and otherwise, offers a pure servicizing model, i.e., Π˜∗2(e) = Π˜
h∗
2 if
c(e) < C2(k(e)), and Π˜
∗
2(e) = Π˜
p∗
se2 otherwise. For this proof, we assume k < K2 = 1/2 for analyt-
ical tractability and brevity. Under this condition, there exists a threshold e = ey such that the
condition c(e) < C2
(
k(e)
)
can be written as e < ey. In addition, Π˜
∗
2(e) is continuous and contin-
uously differentiable at e= ey. Moreover, we have that if c0 ≤ k02 , then Π˜p
∗
se2(e) increases in e for
all e∈ [0,1]. Otherwise, Π˜p∗se2(e) increases in e for e∈
[
0, k0
2c0
]
and decreases thereafter. Similarly, if
c0 ≤C5γ=2(k0), then Π˜h∗2 (e) increases in e for all e∈ [0,1]. Otherwise, there exists a threshold e= ez
such that it increases in e for e∈ [0, ez] and decreases thereafter. In addition, it can be shown that
2k0(2−k0)
3(2c0−k20)
<C5γ=2(k0)<
k
2
. If c0 <C5γ=2(k0), then Π˜
∗
2(e) is increasing in e for all e∈ [0,1], and e∗2 = 1.
Since ep
∗
sa ≤ 1 under this condition, we have e∗2 ≥ ep
∗
sa. If C5γ=2(k0)< c0, then e
p∗
sa < 1, and there are
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three possible candidates to be the global maximizer for Π˜∗2(e), viz., ez,
k0
2c0
or 1. However, we have
that
dΠ˜h
∗
2
de
(epsa)< 0 and
dΠ˜
p∗
se2
de
(epsa)< 0, which implies that e
p∗
sa < ez,
k0
2c0
,1 or ep
∗
sa < e
∗
2. 
A2. Calibration of the model parameters
In what follows, we provide a detailed description of the methods and sources we used to calibrate
our model with the real-life estimates discussed in §4.1. We consider two different examples to
capture the extremes of pooling efficacy: document management services where γ = 1 and cloud
services where γ = 2. For each of them, we estimate the following three parameters: i) the maximum
value for customers’ usage needs Θ (which is normalized to 1 in our model), ii) the operating cost
k, and iii) the unit production cost c.
Document management services. We first calculate the maximum value for customers’ usage
needs Θ in pages/day using the data for Xerox’s document management services found in Ning
et al. (2014): The mean monthly print volume is µ = 2,699 pages with a standard deviation of
σ = 3,504. We calculate Θ as µ + 2 × σ, which gives 10,000 pages/month, or Θ = 10,000/30 =
333.333 pages/day (assuming 30 days in a month). To calculate the production cost for a printer
we utilize information from Xerox’s financial statement and average market prices for office-use
printers. In particular, the profit margin for Xerox’s Document Technology division is 10% (Xerox
2013b). To estimate the market price, we focus on Xerox’s Color Multifunction printers which
vary from {$6.6× 103,$8.8× 103,$11× 103,$13.2× 103} for different models (Xerox 2015a). The
production cost can then by obtained by multiplying these values by (1− 0.1), which gives c ∈
{$6× 103,$8× 103,$10× 103,$12× 103}.
In order to calculate the operating cost k, we need to estimate the cost of ink/toner and cost
of electricity in terms of $/page. From Xerox (2015b), we estimate the average cost of toner/ink
to be $0.1/page (business proposal category). A Xerox Color Multifunction printer consumes 402
watts when running and 111 watts in a standby mode (Xerox 2015a). The specific printer can
print up to 20 pages/minute, which means that a monthly volume of 10,000 pages implies 500
minutes of “continuous” printing per-month. Therefore, we calculate the maximum possible elec-
tricity consumption as
400 watts× 50060 hoursmonth+111 watts×(24×30− 50060 ) hoursmonth
1,000
= 82.345 kWh/month (assuming
24 hours in a day and 30 days in a month). Since, our customers are uniformly distributed we use
the average monthly print volume 10,000/2 = 5,000 to calculate 82.345/5,000 = 0.0165 kWh/page
as our average electricity consumption. We then multiply 0.0165 kWh by 0.0956 $/kWh, which
was the average electricity price for commercial customers in the South Atlantic region of the US
during January 2015 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2015), and obtain the electricity
cost as $0.00157/page. Therefore, the operating cost is 0.1 + 0.00157 = $0.10157/page.
As our model parameters are between zero and one, we need to normalize our estimates. We do
this by dividing the estimates of the production and operating costs by Θ = 333.333 pages/day,
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which is normalized to one in our model. In addition, given that the production cost is incurred
only once over the product’s entire useful life, we divide c by 1460 days (or 4 years), which is the
average useful life of a printer (Statista 2015). This normalization yields the following estimates
for our parameters: c∈ {0.0123,0.0164,0.0205,0.0247} and k= 0.0003 per page. As there is a lack
of estimates regarding the change in printing per unit change in operating cost, we use b= 1.
Cloud services. We first calculate the maximum value for customers’ storage needs by consider-
ing the plans offered by different cloud storage providers such as SugarSync, Dropbox, Google Drive,
Box, etc. There is significant diversity in the available plans, however, SugarSync is one that has
several different storage tiers: 100GB, 250GB, 500GB, and 1TB, out of which the 250GB is the most
popular (see SugarSync 2015). Based on this, we choose Θ = 400GB as our estimate of customers’
maximum storage needs. To calculate the production cost for a server we utilize information from
IBM’s financial statement and average market prices for IBM servers. The profit margin for IBM’s
Systems and Technology division is 35.6% (IBM 2013b). As servers come in a variety of configura-
tions and capacities, we choose a range of prices given by {$3× 103,$6× 103,$9× 103,$12× 103}.
Accordingly, the production cost can be obtained by multiplying these values by (1−0.395), which
gives approximately {$2× 103,$4× 103,$6× 103,$8× 103}.
With respect to the operating cost k, we find an average annual cost of storage of approximately
$0.23 per GB from Diogenes Labs (2008) and $0.186 per GB from Oracle (2015) (for the EMC Isilon
Single-copy disk solution with 3,262TB usable disk capacity). Therefore, we assume an annual
operating cost of $0.2 per GB which translates to approximately a monthly cost of $0.02 per GB. As
before, we normalize our estimates by dividing them by Θ = 400GB. In addition, we also divide the
production cost estimate by 48 months (or 4 years), which is the average useful life of a server (see
Dell 2012). This yields the following estimates for our parameters: c ∈ {0.112,0.205,0.299,0.392}
and k = 4.79× 10−5 per GB. Finally, as there is a lack of information regarding estimates of the
change in storage use per unit change in operating cost, b, we use b= 1.
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